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disseminating the photographs. The court refused the injunction, stating
that the taking of the pictures must be considered the same as other ad-
ministrative procedure of the police to which a person, at times, must be
subjected for the common good.
CONCLUSION
Though many of the factual situations dealt with have not come up in
Illinois, it is probable that the courts here will follow the reasoning in
sister state cases.
In the matters of advertising and magazine-newspaper articles, not too
much difficulty arises. It is often obvious just what does constitute a
newsworthy event which will deprive people of their right to privacy.
In regard to the problem of fingerprints and photographs of arrested
men and the right to distribute such materials, the problem is slightly
more complex. The present position in Illinois is that upon acquittal the
file need not be surrendered, if the file was used for limited purposes and
not in a rogues' gallery. But as to what must be done after a pardon, or
before a conviction, in regard to placing a picture in a rogues' gallery or
disseminating the information, the Illinois courts are silent.
THE RIGHT OF COMMUNISTS TO TRAVEL ABROAD
AND THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEM
OF DUE PROCESS
A Bill has been introduced in Congress which would give the Secretary
of State the power to deny passports to persons knowingly engaged in
activities intended to further the international Communist movement.1
This proposed legislation comes as a result of two decisions, Kent and
Briehl v. Dulles,2 and Dayton v. Dulles,3 by the Supreme Court on June
16, 1958, declaring that the Secretary of State has no such power in the
absence of express Congressional provision.
POLICY TOWARDS COMMUNISTS FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE KENT AND
DAYTON CASES
The policy of refusing passports to leading American Communists was
first adopted after World War I. The policy was ignored between 1931
1 H.R.55, introduced by Rep. Selden January 7, 1959. For an excellent historical and
critical approach to American passport policies, together with recommendations for
revised legislation, consult Freedom to Travel, New York Bar Association, Dodd,
Mead & Company, New York, 1958.
2 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
3 357 U.S. 144 (1958). There is a sharp distinction between these two cases. Dayton
was accused of being a Communist. Kent and Briehl were refused passports due to
their refusal to file an affidavit stating whether or not they were or ever had been
Communists.
COMMENTS
and World War II. After 1948, the Department of State permitted the
issuance of passports to Communists and supporters of Communism who
satisfied the Department that they were not going abroad in the further-
ance of the Communist cause. An exception was made in favor of journal-
ists active in Communist affairs. Soon thereafter, however, the espionage,
propaganda and revolutionary activities carried on by American Com-
munists and alien Communists in possession of American passports was
taken into consideration by the Department of State, which promulgated
various policies, resulting in considerable judicial criticism and finally
producing the pending legislation.
4
In order to evaluate judicial criticism of passport policies, it is necessary
to trace the evolution of the concept of administrative discretion as ap-
plied in the interpretation of the federal statute conferring authority to
grant, issue and verify passports. 5 The first important federal decision
concerning passports, Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy,6 defined a passport as a political
document in the nature of a request by the Secretary of State addressed
to a foreign power, that the bearer may pass safely and freely. It was also
considered as evidence of the citizenship of the bearer. Issuance of a pass-
port was thus discretionary with the Secretary. 7 As recently as 1955, the
Court found a "large discretion" in passport matters lodged by Congress
in the Secretary of State. Accordingly, revocation of a passport did not
amount to a deprivation of a citizenship right.8
Bauer v. Acheson9 was the first case to proclaim the right to travel
abroad as being one protected by the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, can-
cellation of an outstanding passport without a hearing deprived the bearer
of liberty without due process of law, of which the essential elements are
notice and an opportunity to be heard. The appropriate procedure for
such process was not deemed to be necessarily a judicial hearing, but one
4 For a detailed outline of the State Department's passport policy in regard to Com-
munists over the years, consult The Right to Travel, Committee on the Judiciary of
the Senate, 85th Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1958, at
page 263, pages 268-274.
5 22 U.S.C.A. § 211 (a) (1949): "The Secretary of State may grant and issue pass-
ports, and cause passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries by
diplomatic representatives of the United States, and by such consul generals, consuls,
or vice consuls when in charge, as the Secretary of State may designate, and by the
chief or other executive officer of the insular possessions of the United States, under
such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United
States, and no other person shall grant, issue or verify such passports.
6 9 Pet. (U.S.) 692 (1835).
7 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1938); Edsell v. Mark, 179 Fed. 292 (C.A. 9th, 1910);
Miller v. Sinjn, 289 Fed. 388 (C.A. 8th, 1923); In re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274 (D.D.C.,
1896), have reiterated and accepted this discretionary power.
8 Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 223 F.2d
531 (App. D.C., 1955).
9 106 F.Supp. 445 (D.D.C., 1952).
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appropriate to the disposition of issues. In accordance with this decision,
the Department of State issued regulations' ° specifying standards for de-
nial of applications presented by Communists, and created a Passport Ap-
peals Board to hear appeals from adverse decisions. The rules accorded
such applicant only the right to a hearing, to be represented by counsel,
and to examine the transcript of his own testimony."
When an applicant refused to appeal to the Board, but instead took his
case to court, as in Nathan v. Dulles,12 the court, in effect expressing dis-
pleasure over the regulations, was not satisfied that plaintiff had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies, but took the position that he never in
fact had any. The Secretary of State was ordered to issue a passport. On
appeal the order was stayed and the Department was ordered to accord
a quasi-judicial hearing to the applicant. In an effort to make the decision
*moot, a hearing was held by the board under the regulations and a pass-
port was granted.
In Schacbman v. Dulles,"3 it was found that substantive due process had
been violated. The Secretary of State had acted arbitrarily in refusing a
passport, acting under regulation 51.135,14 on the grounds that applicant
was the head of an organization which had been listed by the Attorney
General as subversive, and that he was going abroad on behalf of such
organization.
The court in Boudin v. Dulles" construed regulation 51.135 together
with section 51.170 (which allowed confidential information to be used
in a passport hearing, but called for consideration of the inability of ap-
plicant to meet the information or to attack the credibility of confidential
10 C.F.R. 22: 51.135-51.170 (1958). 12 225 F.2d 29 (App.D.C., 1955).
11 C.F.R. 22: 51.139 (1958). 13 225 F.2d 938 (App. D.C., 1955).
14 C.F.R. 22: 51.135 (1958) "Limitation on Issuance of Passports to Persons Supporting
Communist Movement. In order to promote the national interest by assuring that per-
sons who support the world Communist movement of which the Communist Party is
an integral unit may not, through use of United States passports, further the purposes
of that movement, no passport, except one limited for direct and immediate return to
the United States, shall be issued to: (a) Persons who are members of the Communist
Party or who have recently terminated such membership under such circumstances as
to warrant the conclusion-not otherwise rebutted by the evidence-that they con-
tinue to act in furtherance of the interests and under the discipline of the Communist
Party; (b) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the Com-
munist party, who engage in activities which support the movement under such circum-
stances as to warrant the conclusion-not otherwise rebutted by the evidence-that they
have engaged in such activities as a result of direction, domination, or control exercised
over them by the Communist movement; (c) Persons, regardless of the formal state of
their affiliation with the Communist Party, as to whom there is reason to believe, on the
balance of all the evidence, that they are going abroad to engage in activities which will
advance the Communist movement for the purpose, knowingly and willfully of ad-
yancing that movement."
15 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C., 1955).
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informants) to give substantially unrestricted discretion to the Passport
Office. In the words of the court,
Confidential information is of unquestionable importance to executive officers
in performing their duty, but it should be confined for use in obtaining factual
data which may itself be used of record. . . . All evidence upon which the
office may rely for its decision under §51.135 must appear on record so that
the applicant may have the opportunity to meet it and the court to review it.1'
THE KENT AND DAYTON CASES
In June, 1958 the Supreme Court was faced with the problem of the
validity of the refusal to issue passports to three applicants, Rockwell
Kent, Walter Briehl and Weldon Bruce Rayton, under regulation 51.135;
findings in the case of Dayton as to his Communist affiliations were based
on confidential information. The Court reasoned that the right of exit is
a personal right included within the word "liberty" as used in the Fifth
Amendment. Delegated powers which curtail or dilute such rights are to
be construed narrowly. Therefore, a study of policies at the time of the
Passport Act of 1926,17 and again in 1952, when Congress made a passport
necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion of the
Secretary of State, was thought necessary to discover congressional intent.
It was found that administrative practice at the time of passage of the first
act had gelled around only two categories: (1) Questions pertinent to the
citizenship and allegiance of applicant,"' and (2) Questions as to whether
applicant was engaging in conduct which would violate the laws of the
United States.19 Furthermore, the court refused to impute to Congress
the purpose, at the time of passage of the 1952 statute, to give the Secre-
tary unbridled discretion. Action in categories other than the two already
mentioned was found to result solely from war power, the application of
which had no relevancy at this time. Therefore, in the absence of express
legislative provision in explicit terms, the grounds of Communism formed
no valid standard by which a citizen's right of movement might be re-
stricted.
The legislation currently pending 20 would provide such express pro-
vision in explicit terms. However, concurrently with solving the problem
of authority, the passage of such a law would create many procedural
problems.
16 Ibid., at 222. 17 22 U.S.C.A. § 211(a) (1949).
18 "No passport shall be granted or issued to or verified for any other persons than
those owing allegiance, whether citizens or not, to the United States." 22 U.S.C.A. S 212
(1949).
19 The Court relied on 3 Moore, International Law Digest (1906) § 512; 3 Hack-
worth, Digest of International Law (1942) § 268; 2 Hyde, International Law (2d rev.
ed., 1945), § 401.
20 Authority cited note 1, supra.
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THE UNRESOLVED QUESTION OF DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court recognized that a problem of the constitutionality
involved in the use of confidential information existed in the Dayton case,
but found it unnecessary to deal with this problem, due to the fact that
the Secretary was found to lack authority in the first instance. In the
event that Congress delegates such authority, will decisions based on in-
formation necessarily confidential be upheld?
A possible solution to this question may be found in close scrutiny of
the judicial history of the Dayton case. The Secretary of State had ob-
tained summary judgment in the district court. On appeal,21 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia called for an affidavit of detailed
finding in keeping with the requirements of the Boudin case. The Secre-
tary was ordered to state whether the evidence was disclosed or not to
applicant, and if the latter, to explain the reason therefor with such partic-
ularity as in his judgment the circumstances permitted.
The case was remanded to the District Court, and after consideration
of "Decisions and Findings in the case of Weldon Bruce Dayton" filed
in accordance with the appellate court order, the Secretary was found to
be acting both within his authority and in accordance with due process
requirements.22 The latter finding is of importance in the light of possible
granting of such authority.
The affidavit filed by the Secretary of State set forth various associations
and activities of Dayton which were proved by information contained in
open record, including in some instances applicant's own statements. Each
of these associations and activities was then designated as Communist, on
the basis of confidential information contained in the files of the Depart-
ment of State. The Secretary stated that the substance of this confidential
information was disclosed to the applicant during his passport hearings.
(Applicant's counsel were also allowed to cross-examine three Govern-
ment witnesses.) Public disclosure of sources and details, however, was
deemed "detrimental to our national interest" in that it would adversely
affect the ability to obtain further information and prejudice foreign re-
lations. Thus, in effect, a statement of the fact alone, but not the basis for
considering those facts as proof of Communism, was presented for judicial
scrutiny. The district court considered itself bound to accept the reasons
advanced for not disclosing sources of the confidential information.
Neither a violation of procedural nor substantive due process was found.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed
this finding.23
21 Dayton v. Dulles, 237 F.2d 43 (App.D.C., 1956).
22 Dayton v. Dulles, 146 F.Supp. 876 (D.D.C., 1956).
23 Dayton v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 71 (App. D.C., 1957).
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Since the Supreme Court did not discuss the due process requirement in
the Dayton case, the district court opinion in this case, and the appellate
court's affirmative opinion remain the last word on the problem of wheth-
er denial of a passport based on confidential information is violative of
due process.
REASONING OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Strength for the Dayton decision in the district court was culled from
the observation by Mr. Justice Holmes in Moyer v. Peabody: "It is fa-
miliar that what is due process depends on circumstances. It varies with
the subject-matter and the necessities of the situation. ' 24 Thus far, this
principle has been applied to cases of summary proceedings for taxes,2 5
executive decisions for exclusion from the country,26 emergency execu-
tive power at times of insurrection,2 7 and times of strike,28 and more re-
cently, to the taking of a party into protective custody under an applicable
insanity statute.29 Most cases seem to imply the "necessities of the situa-
tion" call for immediate action because of emergency conditions. No
attempt was made by the district court in the Dayton case, however, to
characterize present world conditions or the circumstances of our foreign
relations as being in a state comparable to an emergency situation.
Appeal was further made in Dayton to the words of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath:
Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a
process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise
of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of
the process.390
As illustration, Frankfurter cited two cases for contrast. Ng Fung Ho v.
White,31 wherein Chinese claiming citizenship were, under due process
entitled to a judicial as opposed to merely an executive determination of
the fact of their citizenship, in deportment proceedings, was compared
with Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Company,32
which declared summary proceedings sufficient for taxes, authority for
such action found in practice from remote antiquity due to imperative
24212 U.S. 78,84 (1909). 25 18 How. (U.S.) 272 (1855).
26 United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905).
27 Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); United States ex rel Seymour v. Fisher, 280
Fed. 208 (D. Neb., 1922).
28 Adams v. United States ex rel Palmer, 29 F.2d 541 (C.A. 8th, 1928).
29 Kenney v. Killian, 133 F.Supp. 571 (W.D.Mich., 1955).
30 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951). Thus, Frankfurter declared the Attorney General's listing
of certain organizations subversive without notice or hearing, as violative of due
process.
31259 U.S. 276 (1922). 32 18 How. (U.S.) 272 (1855).
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necessity, which permitted few countries to allow their tax claims to be-
come subjects of judicial controversy. The Dayton case appears to be
much more similar to the Chinese case, a fact which lessens, possibly de-
stroys, the value of Frankfurter's words as applied by the district court in
support of the use of confidential information.
Another source of authority was found in Betts v. Brady:
That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of justice, may in other circumstances, and in
the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.38
Such was the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in finding that the
refusal of a state court to appoint counsel to represent an indigent defend-
ant at a trial in which he was convicted of robbery, did not deny him
due process of law. In Betts, the Supreme Court further made a compari-
son with the case of Lisenba v. California,34 which dealt with the voluntary
confession phase of due process, and declared the aim of due process in
forbidding the use of involuntary confessions as being to prevent funda-
mental unfairness inherent in the use of such evidence, whether true or
false. The failure of the arresting officers promptly to produce the de-
fendant before an examining magistrate, their detention of him for three
days, and a minor assault committed upon him (he was slapped once),
together with unauthorized removal of defendant for questioning, and
denial of the opportunity to consult counsel at one of the interrogation ses-
sions were all deemed illegal and in deprivation of liberty without due
process. Defandant would have been afforded relief if he could have gained
access to a court to seek it. However, these facts were not such as to render
the confession later obtained involuntary, as opposed to confessions ex-
torted in graver circumstances under which here would be no hesitation in
setting aside a conviction.85
An examination of the basis for the concept of "fundamental fairness
under the circumstances" as proposed in the Betts case leaves grave doubt
as to the fundamental fairness in allowing Dayton to examine government
witnesses in a private hearing, while not allowing the credibility of these
witnesses to be attacked in court. At the least, it may definitely be said
that the issue is arguable both in favor and against a finding of such fair-
ness, and mere reference to the Betts principle without an attempt to draw
an analogy to the facts of the Dayton case is quite invalid.
33 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1941). 34 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
35 "These were secured by protracted and repeated questioning of ignorant and
untutored persons, in whose minds the power of officers was greatly magnified; who
sensed the adverse sentiment of the community and the danger of mob violence; who
had been held incommunicado, without the advice of friends or of counsel; some of
whom had been taken by officers at night from the prison into dark and lonely places
for questioning." Ibid., 239.
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The Dayton case continues at page 882:
In addition to providing protection to the rights of individual citizens, the
Constitution also recognizes interests of the Government and when conflicts
arise, they can be resolved only by "balancing the conflicting individual and
national interests involved."
At this point, the district court is quoting from American Communications
Association, C.I.O. v. Douds,36 which case balanced the effects of the
National Labor Relations Act in excluding certain union rights from
Communists, as weighed against the public right to protection against po-
litical strikes. The Fifth Amendment was not in issue.
In conclusion, the Dayton case considered the problem disposed of in
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.:
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for
foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and
ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts,
without the relevant information should review and perhaps nullify actions
of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. Nor can cotirts sit
in camera in order to be taken into executive confidences.3 7
However, the airlines case dealt with a controversy arising because the
Civil Aeronautics Board awarded the right to engage in overseas and
foreign air transportation over a certain air route to one of two com-
peting applicant companies. Such decisions, when approved by the Presi-
dent, were said to "embody presidential discretion as to political matters
beyond the competence of courts to adjudicate." 8 Clearly, the great
amount of litigation on the subject has established passport to be outside
the realm of unlimited presidential discretion in political matters.
APPELLATE COURT REASONING IN THE DAYTON CASE
In affirming the district court decision, the Appellate court for the
District of Columbia39 took into consideration several cases dealing with the
application of due process to commerce rights. West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish40 involved the minimum wage act. The freedom to contract-one
of the freedoms guaranteed by due process of law-was limited upon the
ground that community interest required protection of the health of
women and of a relatively helpless class of workers.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.41 allowed the President to
36 339 U.S. 382, 410 (1949).
37 Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 337 U.S. 103, 111
(1948).
38 Ibid., at 114.
39 Dayton v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 71 (App. D.C., 1957).
40 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 41299 U.S. 304 (1936),
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consider confidential information in reaching a decision to forbid the
sale of munitions of war to persons in certain countries, since the embargo
was within the area of foreign affairs (or at least affected foreign rela-
tions). Similar results were reached in cases involving presidential prohi-
bition of the exportation of coal and other materials. 42
The appellate court presented a better argument than the district court,
in that it recognized the analogical inadequacies in arguing from cases in-
volving commerce, in respect to which the scope of due process is not
the same as it is in respect to the inherent rights of individuals. The appel-
late court argued, nevertheless, that the principles of the commerce cases
are "of assistance" in testing the nature of process necessary to the depriva-
tion of the individual right to travel abroad.
The Communist abuse of such right, in the opinion of the appellate
court, obviously affects our foreign affairs. The court takes care to point
out that this is not to say that the issuance of a passport is such conduct of
foreign affairs as to grant unfettered discretion to the Secretary of State.
Nevertheless, in applying the principles of the commerce cases considered
above, and as a simple matter of common sense, the appellate court felt
obliged to decree that the Secretary can not be compelled to disclose in-
formation so as to adversely affect our international security or the con-
duct of our foreign affairs.
CONCLUSION
Dissatisfaction with the application by the district and appellate courts
in Dayton of arguments as to the flexible character of due process require-
ments leads to the conclusion that, had the Supreme Court reached this
constitutional question, the decision on this point would also have been
reversed. This seems especially true in view of the strict treatment of
discretionary power in regard to Communists, of which the State Depart-
ment had considered itself possessed since World War I.
It would seem wise, therefore, for Congress to set out the procedure
under which passports will be denied to Communists, especially in regard
to the use of confidential information. Of course, this will be subject to
judicial review under due process standards. At any rate, in the event of
the passage of House Bill 55. 43 more pronouncements by the Supreme Court
can be expected, either in judgment of procedural legislation or in judg-
42 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Chicago and Southern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 337 U.S. 103 (1948), discussed at length by the district
court, was again quoted wit approval.
43 Authority cited note 1, supra.
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ment of procedural rules adopted by the Department of State as a result
of the failure of Congress to legislate specifically on the matter.44
44 Legislation is also needed on the issue of requiring an affidavit as to Communist
associations to be filed on the part of an applicant. As stated above, supra at footnote 3,
this problem played an important role in the Kent and Briehl cases. The Appellate
Court for the District of Columbia in Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (App. D.C., 1957),
decided such affidavit, the requirement of which would come prior to any actual al-
legations of Communist activities, and by which the applicant was not entitled to be
confronted with witnesses and evidence sustaining the Secretary's suggestion of Com-
munist affiliations, was not in violation of due process. The point was resolved on two
bases: (1) Applying the rules of civil procedure, it is found that applicant must raise
the issue of facts as to his Communist affiliations, in order to get an evidentiary hearing
on the facts. (2) It is customary to require applicants to supply pertinent information
under oath. There is no reason to treat a passport application differently. Chief Judge
Edgerton, dissenting, pointed out the critical factual differences between this case,
where the liberty to travel is made subject to restraints, and prior cases dealing, for
example, with the retainment of State employment [as in Garner v. Board of Public
Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) .
The Supreme Court did not consider the issue, since it solved the Kent and Briehl
cases, as it did the Dayton case, on the basis of lack of authority on the part of the
Secretary of State to deny passports on the grounds of Communism. Thus, some definite
statement, promulgated by Congress, or issued by the Secretary with power derived
from Congress is necessary. Both will necessarily be subject to Constitutional inter-
pretation by the Court.
SOME ASPECTS OF ILLINOIS LAND TRUSTS
INTRODUCTION
The last half-century has seen the development in Illinois of a rather
curious type of trust; namely, the Illinois land trust. Based on a liberal
application of fundamental common law principles, it offers many ad-
vantages in the holding of real property and estate planning.'
Under a typical Illinois land trust agreement, the beneficiary retains the
right to possession and control over the real estate, including the full
power of management. He collects and distributes the income, leases, in-
sures, develops, finances and directs the sale of the property as he sees fit.
He may terminate the trust when he desires or may add property to the
trust when he wishes. The beneficiary has exclusive and full powers in
these matters. The trustee may execute deeds and mortgages or otherwise
deal with the real estate only upon the written direction of the beneficiary.
The beneficial interest is assignable and transferrable with the same facility
as a stock certificate. Since it is assignable, the beneficial interest can be
1 An Illinois land trust may be created by anyone who desires it. It is generally known
as an excellent procedure for holding real estate by syndicates, subdividers, builders,
industrial concerns, partnerships, associations, professional groups, societies and corpo-
rations. For a thorough discussion of Illinois land trusts and their present popularity in
Florida, see Caplan, The Law of Land Trusts (Central Bank & Trust Co., Florida, 1958).
